In 2002, Yeh, Shen, and Hwang proposed a one-time password authentication scheme using smart cards. However, Tsuji et al. and Ku et al. showed that it is vulnerable to the stolen verifier attack. Therefore, this paper proposes an improved one-time password authentication scheme, which not only keeps the security of the scheme of Yeh-Shen-Hwang but also can withstand the stolen verifier attack.
Introduction
In recent years, internet applications and mobile techniques have been developed significantly. Since the internet is open and users do not see each other, how to correctly authenticate the identities of users has become very important. Password authentication scheme is the most common method to identify users. Many password authentication schemes [1] - [7] have been proposed for electronic commerce environments. In 2002, Yeh, Shen, and Hwang [8] proposed a secure one-time password authentication scheme using smart cards. The authors claimed that it can withstand many various attacks such as replay attacks, server spoofing attacks, off-line dictionary attacks, and active attacks. However, Tsuji et al. [9] and Ku et al. [10] showed that the scheme of Yeh-Shen-Hwang is still vulnerable to the stolen verifier attack. In this paper, we propose an improved one-time password authentication scheme. This improved scheme is able to prevent the stolen verifier attack and is as efficient as the scheme of Yeh-Shen-Hwang.
The rest of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we review Yeh-Shen-Hwang scheme and the stolen verifier attacks of Tsuji 
Definitions and Notations
The definitions and notations used in this paper are described as follows.
• U: the user • S : the server • E: the attacker • S EED: a pre-shared secret of S and U • D i : a large random number generated by the server
Review of Yeh-Shen-Hwang Scheme
In [8] , Yeh, Shen and Hwang proposed a secure one-time password authentication scheme, which adopts smart cards to store users' secret values. The scheme of Yeh-ShenHwang is divided into three stages: the registration stage, the login stage, and the authentication stage. We describe the three stages of Yeh-Shen-Hwang scheme as follows.
Registration Stage
Initially, S selects a large random number S EED, and issues a smart card containing the pre-shared secret S EED to U.
Then, S selects a random number D and a number N, and computes H(D). S performs the XOR operation on S EED and D, then sends N, S EED⊕D, H(D) to U. Once receiving them, U extracts D by performing the XOR operation on S EED ⊕ D and the S EED which is stored in the smart card. Then, D is hashed one time and compared with the H(D).
If it is equivalent, the identity of S is authenticated. Then, U computes p 0 ⊕ D and sends it to S , where 
Tsuji et al. Attack
In [9] , Tsuji et al. showed that the scheme of Yeh-ShenHwang is vulnerable to the stolen-verifier attack. The attacking procedure is presented in the following.
First, an attacker E eavesdrops the communications of (i − 1)th login as follows.
U←S :
In the ith login, U and S communicates the following data.
where X is an arbitrary number. After receiving p i ⊕ D i ⊕ X, S rejects U. When U is rejected, U sends the login request again. Then, S sends the following data to U as a response.
U←S : C i , S EED ⊕ D i , H(D i ) ⊕ p i−1 E intercepts those data, and extracts D i by (S EED ⊕
After receiving them, it replies the following data.
Similarly, E intercepts it, and extracts p i+1 by (p i+1 ⊕ D i ) ⊕ D i . Then, E sends p i ⊕ D i to S . After receiving the data, U is authenticated by S . In the (i + 1)th login, E can impersonate U to login S as follows. 
, E can guess a password/secret K , and then computes
. If p i = p i , E knows that the guessing value K is a correct password. E can produce p j , where i + 1≤ j≤N, and impersonate as U to login S or impersonate as S to cheat U.
Improvement
In this section, we propose an improvement on Yeh-ShenHwang scheme to resist the attack as stated above. The proposed scheme is described as follows.
Registration Stage 1. U←S : S EED 2. U←S : N, H(S EED
Initially, S computes a value S EED = H(ID ⊕ x), and issues a smart card containing the pre-shared secret S EED to U, where ID is the identity of U and x is the secret of S . Then, S selects a random number D and a timestamp T , and then computes S K = D||T . S also decides a number N which indicates the login number of U.
Next, S computes H(S EED ⊕ N) ⊕ S K and sends N, H(S EED ⊕ N) ⊕ S K, H(S K) to U.
Once receiving those data, U performs the XOR operation on N and the S EED which is stored in the smart card, and hashs S EED ⊕ N one time. 
For the ith login, S first computes S EED = H(ID ⊕ x) and generates a random number 
Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of our improved scheme. Considering Tsuji et al. attack and Ku et al. attack, an attacker may steal the verifier p i−1 from S after the (i − 1)th login and intercept the communication between U and S . Since it is very difficult to derive S EED by p i−1 in the login stage, unless the attacker can reverse the one-way hash function. So, the attacker cannot forge a valid login request message in the ith login. Thus, our improved scheme can withstand the stolen-verifier attack.
Furthermore, in the Yeh-Shen-Hwang scheme, if S provides the login services for m users, S must store m preshared value S EED in his/her database. The probability that S EED is stolen is relatively high. The improved scheme computes S EED t by S EED t = H(ID t ⊕ x), where 1≤t≤m. S only needs to keep x in secret.
Conclusions
In this paper, a simple but useful improvement on YehShen-Hwang scheme is proposed, which can effectively withstand the stolen-verifier attack. Moreover, the improvement is as efficient as the original scheme.
